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3Foreword
The European financial and—partly stemming from this—fiscal crisis is 
the most severe economic crisis to have occurred since the 1920s. As 
with every crisis of such dimensions, it has created insecurity and doubt 
about the existing political systems and institutional arrangements. These 
concerns are being exploited by nationalistic parties and the virulent 
media, and are solely focused on the national political arena. National self-
interest and prejudices against European neighbours and fellow European 
citizens are increasing: southern Europeans are portrayed as averse to 
work and unwilling to reform, northern Europeans as lacking solidarity. 
Abusive comparisons with Fascism have even been made.
The boost to populist parties and the receptivity of the public to their 
messages have been facilitated by the current crisis. The magnitude of 
the electoral gains that populist parties have been able to acquire due to 
their anti-European slogans and programmes is surprising and worrying. 
They succeed by delivering apparently straightforward solutions, which 
are often derived from national interest, to what are actually complex 
political problems—solutions that have persuasive power amongst a broad 
audience. This kind of nationalist and anti-European rhetoric endangers 
not only economic prosperity, but also democracy.  
The current study on populism, Exposing the Demagogues: Right-wing 
and National Populist Parties in Europe, by the Centre for European Studies 
(CES) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) has been published just in 
time. The editors, Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb, have combined 
detailed case studies from Western and Eastern European countries with 
in-depth transnational comparative analyses. They have succeeded in 
painting a picture of the recent success of populist parties throughout 
Europe’s political landscape by displaying their facilitating and inhibiting 
factors.
The study also acts as a warning that we must not waver in our commitment 
to a strong European Union, the world’s most successful community of 
peace and freedom. We must not forget that the EU transformed opponents 
and enemies into partners and friends in a very short period of time. If 
we leave the floor to Europe’s populist parties—such as Jean-Marie Le 
Pen’s National Front or Geert Wilder’s Party for Freedom—they will happily 
sacrifice everything we have achieved over the last few decades for their 
own political profit.
4The CES–KAS study makes a valuable contribution to explaining 
this danger; the title Exposing the Demagogues is well chosen. As the 
individual chapters of the study demonstrate, the populists’ anti-European 
propaganda is receiving more and more support from European citizens. 
Populists’ characterisation of European politics as elitist and bureaucratic; 
their disapproval of any further steps towards European integration; and 
their dissatisfaction with financial solidarity transfers, which have most 
benefited the crisis-ridden states in the south of Europe—all of these 
factors have prompted electoral success for populists in many European 
states. Populist parties exploit a pre-existing lack of confidence that is 
increasingly causing European citizens to turn away from European 
politics and the political system. By doing this, the parties are intensifying 
the crisis with their populist views and rhetoric. 
This complex of problems is aggravated by the lack of a truly transnational 
European public space where current problems can be discussed in an 
appropriate European context. The media in particular must move the 
focus of their attention away from the national political arena towards the 
European one. As long as politicians and the media focus mainly on the 
national level, it will be easy for populists, such as Le Pen, to sustain this 
disruptive, and ultimately destructive, form of politics.
The growing number of anti-European parties and their increasing 
electoral successes are worrying from a political point of view. They pose 
a threat to national Christian Democratic and conservative parties and 
to the European People’s Party, which is highly committed to European 
integration. We must not encourage those who, in the face of current 
challenges, consider the European idea detrimental. We must tackle the 
populists on their own ground by exposing their slogans as nationalist 
propaganda and their programmes as unfeasible and even damaging if 
implemented on a European level. The examples of Sweden and Poland 
show us that the best way to beat the populist parties is through successful 
policymaking by the mainstream parties.
 
It is of equal importance that we increase our efforts to better explain 
generic policies and to regain the trust of Europe’s citizens. We must 
better illustrate the measures we have chosen in response to the financial 
and fiscal crisis, and our achievements thus far. We must emphasise that 
a sustainable and enduring solution can only be reached through more 
Europe. In this regard we have to make it clear that Europe is much more 
than just a community of purpose.
5If we do not succeed in this matter, all the achievements which we have 
accomplished in the course of European integration, and which today we 
take for granted, will be endangered at some point in the future. Such an 
outcome would also pose a threat to the peace of the European continent.
As Jean-Claude Juncker once said: ‘Those who doubt Europe and those 
who despair of Europe should visit Europe’s military cemeteries. There is 
no other place where one could get a better, more touching and more 
powerful feeling for what Europeans can bring about for the worst if they 
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9Preface
After the failure of Timo Soini, party chair of The (True) Finns, in the Finnish 
presidential elections of January 2012, or the moderate losses of the 
Danish People’s Party in the Danish parliamentary election of November 
2011, one could be forgiven for thinking that Europe’s right-wing populists 
were in decline. But even if we take into consideration the setback of 
the Dutch Party for Freedom in the most recent parliamentary election 
of September 2012, it is clear that Europe’s right-wing populists are far 
from being marginalised. In some countries they have even become the 
largest or second-largest parties, as in Switzerland and Norway. Marine Le 
Pen’s National Front gained an impressive 17.9% of the votes cast in the 
French presidential election of April 2012. Although she failed to get into 
the second round of the election, her result was even better than that of 
her father 10 years previously. And a few weeks later, the National Front 
came close to breaking its 1997 record by winning almost 14% of the vote 
and two seats in the French parliament—making it the third-largest party 
in France.
Right-wing populists have become firmly established as relevant and 
serious political players, who exercise significant political influence, both 
on their country’s politics and at the European level. What is remarkable 
is that the right-wing populists have recalibrated their propaganda, 
moving away from xenophobia to some extent and towards pronounced 
Euroscepticism, and that this recalibration has turned out to be quite 
successful. Whether in the Finnish parliamentary election of April 2011, 
the French elections of 2012 or even in the Netherlands, if we consider the 
reasons for this early election, criticism of ‘distant’ EU practices in general, 
and of further European integration in particular; open aversion to further 
financial transfers for crisis-shaken economies; and prejudice against ‘too 
much power in Brussels’ have brought the populists considerable electoral 
support. 
For all actors involved in EU politics these signs should be taken seriously. 
They clearly point to a growing distance between the EU superstructures 
and modes of policymaking on the one hand, and the expectations and 
concerns of a growing proportion of voters in EU Member States on the 
other. As two political think tanks either directly involved in EU politics 
or deeply committed in the idea of European integration, the Centre for 
European Studies and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung have decided, not 
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Geert Wilders and the 
Party for Freedom
in the Netherlands: 
A Political Entrepreneur
in the Polder
Paul Lucardie and Gerrit Voerman
INTRODUCTION
Pillarisation may have prevented the rise of populist movements in the 
Netherlands, at least until the end of the twentieth century. After all, 
pillarisation (verzuiling in Dutch) implies that the population is divided 
and organised along ideological and religious lines. Catholics attend 
Catholic schools and universities, join Catholic trade unions, read 
Catholic newspapers and magazines, listen to Catholic radio, watch 
Catholic television and vote for a Catholic party, while Calvinists and 
Social Democrats do the same (mutatis mutandis). So the notion of a 
homogeneous people, which constitutes a defining characteristic of any 
populist movement, does not make sense in a pillarised society. Dutch 
Catholics tended to identify with their Catholic elite, much more than with 
other segments of the Dutch people. So did the Calvinists and the Social 
Democrats. Occasionally Dutch politicians used populist rhetoric, but 
even when they pretended to appeal to the Dutch people at large, they 
had in mind their own pillar. Attempts by dissident or maverick politicians 
to mobilise people from different pillars for a populist movement did occur, 
but were short-lived and not very successful (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 
21–36).
Towards the end of the twentieth century, pillars disintegrated. As a result of 
secularisation, individualisation, increasing mobility and the development 
of the mass media, individuals identified less and less with a religious or 
ideological pillar. The ties between the pillarised organisations weakened. 
Catholic universities, newspapers and broadcasting associations no longer 
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supported the Catholic party, while the Catholic trade unions merged 
with the Social Democrats’ unions. In 1980, the Catholic party merged 
with the two main Protestant parties into the Christian Democratic Party 
(Christen Democratisch Appel, CDA). Increasing numbers of Catholics and 
Protestants no longer voted automatically for a religious party but switched 
to the Social Democrats (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) or the conservative 
liberal party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD). 
At the same time, the ideological differences between the major parties 
seemed to diminish. The Christian Democrats reduced their emphasis 
on the ideals of a corporatist economy and of a Christian society with 
Christian morals, while the Social Democrats relinquished their ambitions 
for a planned economy and came to accept the market version. Thus the 
political elites as well as the Dutch people became more homogeneous, 
creating a potential for populist movements (Thomassen 2000, 206–9). 
In the 1990s the potential was realised to only a modest extent by a 
number of parties. In 1994 an ethnocentric nationalist party with populist 
demands for direct democracy—named Centre Democrats in order to 
avoid any associations with the extreme right—obtained three seats in the 
Tweede Kamer, the lower house of parliament, but disintegrated rapidly 
and disappeared from the scene in 1998 (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 
31–2; Lucardie 1998). In 1994 the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, 
SP) entered parliament with two seats; it had been founded in 1971 as 
the Communist Party of the Netherlands (Marxist–Leninist) but gradually 
shed its Maoism, Leninism and Marxism and shifted towards a left-wing 
Social Democracy, while retaining its populist appeal to the people and 
its critique of the political elite in the Netherlands (Lucardie and Voerman 
2012, 37–69; Voerman 2011; Voerman 2012). It would grow rather rapidly, 
mobilising more voters as well as registering more members. Yet this party 
will not concern us here, as it is definitely not a right-wing or a national 
populist party. 
At about the same time, local parties emerged in several Dutch cities 
that articulated a populist critique of the political elite as pursuing selfish 
ambitions and realising grand urban renewal projects without consideration 
for the interests of the people and the quality of life (leefbaarheid) in the 
community. In 1999 the leaders of two of these local parties decided to set 
up a national party, called Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands), with 
a populist platform (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 71–82). Two years later, 
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the party elected a rather peculiar political leader, with the name of Pim 
(originally Wilhelmus) Fortuyn.
 
Fortuyn was peculiar because of his exuberant, theatrical personality, his 
whims, his almost exhibitionistic homosexuality and his maverick political 
past. He started as a Marxist, joined the PvdA in 1973 but left it in 1989 and 
had flirted with VVD and CDA without joining either party. As a professional 
public speaker and columnist for a weekly magazine, he had criticised 
the political establishment as well as multiculturalism in the Netherlands 
and warned against creeping Islamisation. Multiculturalism had been a 
taboo topic in Dutch politics until that point. When the leader of the Centre 
Democrats called for abolition of the multicultural society without clarifying 
what he meant he was condemned in court for racial discrimination, and 
he and his party were boycotted in parliament. 
When Fortuyn refused to tone down his criticism of the ‘backward’ 
Islamic culture and argued for the abolition of the ban on discrimination 
in the constitution, the leadership of Leefbaar Nederland expelled him. In 
February 2002 he founded his own party, the List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn, LPF). The party’s primary goal was to return power to the people 
through direct election of public officials, as well as a radical reform of 
public administration.1 This relatively moderate populism was combined 
with moderate nationalism and economic as well as cultural liberalism—
and a bit of Islamophobia (Lucardi and Voerman 2012, 102–15; Lucardie 
2008, 158–60). With his charismatic and theatrical personality, Fortuyn 
received substantial media attention and managed to break through the 
taboo surrounding nationalism and Islamophobia. He paid a price. On 6 
May 2002, he was assassinated by a leftist animal-rights activist. Nine 
days later, his party won 17% of the popular vote and became the second-
largest party in parliament, with 26 out of 150 seats. It proved to be a pyrrhic 
victory. The party joined a government coalition with CDA and VVD which 
collapsed within three months because of a rapidly escalating conflict 
between two of its ministers that polarised and paralysed the parliamentary 
group as well as the party leadership. Expelled from the government, the 
party failed to close ranks. By 2006, it had lost all credibility as well as its 
parliamentary seats. A year later it disbanded.
1  According to Fortuyn, municipalities should gain more power at the expense of 
central government, and public services like schools and hospitals should become 
smaller, less bureaucratic and more transparent, in short, more accountable to elected 
politicians (Fortuyn 2002, 133–51, 183–6).
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Yet populism did not die with Fortuyn and his party. Many supporters of 
the LPF switched in 2006 to a new party, founded the same year by an 
independent member of parliament who had deserted the VVD in 2004. 
Geert Wilders was a very different person than Fortuyn—less extraverted 
and less exuberant, far from exhibitionistic—but he shared many of his 
ideas and recognised that Fortuyn prepared the ground for him (Buijt 
2012). Initially he was more of a conservative Liberal with modest populist 
and nationalist tendencies, but gradually his populism became stronger 
while his liberalism receded into the background (Vossen 2011). In 2006 
his Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) entered parliament with 
nine seats. It obtained four seats in the European Parliament in 2009.2 
The PVV took part in very few municipal elections; in 2010 it participated 
only in The Hague and Almere, a commuter town near Amsterdam, where, 
however, it became the largest party. In the parliamentary election of 2010 
the party won almost 16% of the popular vote and 24 seats. Subsequently, 
it signed a ‘toleration agreement’ with CDA and VVD, which formed a 
minority government. The PVV supported the government in many but not 
all cases. The financial and economic crisis made cooperation increasingly 
difficult, however, as the PVV refused to agree to cutbacks in welfare, 
pensions or health care and refused to bow to the diktat of Brussels. In 
April 2012 the government resigned. In the provincial elections of 2011 
its share of the vote had gone down to 12%; in the general elections of 
12 September 2012 it declined to 10%. The loss of nine seats can be 
attributed to the role of the party in the crisis (avoiding responsibility), but 
possibly also to growing internal troubles (see below) and the radicalisation 
of some of its positions, specifically its strong rejection of the European 
Union.
ELECTORATE
The electorate of the PVV was concentrated to some extent in peripheral 
areas in the south-west, south-east and north-east of the Netherlands and 
in the commuter towns around Rotterdam and Amsterdam, though in the 
capital city itself fewer than 5% voted for the party in 2006 and 9% in 2010. 
The electorate was predominantly secular. Three-quarters of the voters in 
2006 did not belong to any religious denomination, which is more than 
2  When the Netherlands acquired an additional seat, it was assigned to the PVV but 
the candidate who occupied it was expelled from the party for drunken driving so the 
party continued to have four seats.
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average.3 It was also more urban or suburban and young and male than 
average, while the income and educational level were a little below average. 
In 2010 the electorate had expanded, mainly at the expense of PvdA 
and SP, but its composition had hardly changed (Schmeets 2011, 226–
8). Dissatisfaction was probably a key motive for voting for the PVV. 
Compared with other voters in 2010, PVV supporters were the least 
satisfied with government policy over the previous three years and with 
the way that Dutch democracy operated. They had less confidence in 
political parties, parliament and government, they were the most cynical 
about politicians and had the least confidence in their own political 
influence and effectiveness. As to be expected, their political views tied in 
fairly closely with the PVV programme. They felt that immigrants needed 
to integrate, that the number of refugees admitted should be minimised 
and that Muslims should not be let in at all. They also believed that the 
government should take a tougher stance on crime, that the Netherlands 
spends too much money on development aid, that European unification 
had gone much too far and that Turkey should not join the European 
Union. PVV voters adopted the most extreme conservative or right-wing 
positions on all these issues, but differed less from other parties on other 
issues. On gay marriage, pensions, nuclear power plants, home mortgage-
interest deductions and tax cuts, PVV voters did not differ significantly 
from the average voter. In a classic left-versus-right issue like income 
distribution, they occupied a moderate left position, fairly close to that 
of the PvdA voters. Wilders’s winning formula of a combination between 
socio-economically left-wing views and socioculturally right-wing ideas 
had indeed succeeded, at least in 2010. In 2012 the PVV lost more than a 
third of its electorate. Many voters may have returned to the VVD and the 
SP.4
PROGRAMME, TOPICS, MOBILISATION STRATEGIES
The ideology of the PVV can be considered a blend of nationalism, anti-
Islamism, populism, conservatism and liberalism. The liberal elements 
became weaker over time, while nationalism, anti-Islamism and populism 
became stronger. 
3  The data were provided by Dr Henk van der Kolk (University of Twente). See also the 
Appendix in K. Aarts et al. (2007, 275–82.).
4  At the time of writing, exact data were not available.
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When he was a Member of Parliament for the VVD, Wilders criticised the 
welfare state and Dutch corporatism from a classical liberal perspective 
(Fennema 2010, 39–47). He did not seem very happy with the ‘purple’ 
coalition between his party and the PvdA and the left-wing liberal party 
Democrats 66 (Democraten 66, D66). In 2004 he and another MP wrote a 
pamphlet advocating a right-wing turn for his party, giving priority to issues 
such as fighting Islamic terrorism, increasing punishment for serious 
crimes, deregulation and a reduction of foreign aid (Fennema 2010, 81–2). 
The party leadership was irritated by the pamphlet and asked Wilders to 
withdraw it. When he refused, a break with the party became inevitable. 
In the first election platform of the PVV, liberal and conservative issues 
such as tax reduction, crime and security came before immigration and 
democratic reforms. The party wanted to reduce government subsidies 
and cut the size of the civil service, yet hire more policemen, nurses and 
teachers. It favoured liberalisation in the environmental sector, but not with 
respect to immigration policies (PVV 2006, 407–10). The PVV also proved 
liberal with respect to moral issues like gay rights or euthanasia, even if 
these did not figure in party platforms. After 2006, the liberal elements 
in the ideology of the PVV receded into the background, though they did 
not disappear altogether. The party remained conservative in its position 
on crime and punishment. In the socio-economic realm, however, it no 
longer strove for liberal reforms but opted for ‘unqualified defense of the 
welfare state’ and a ‘social Netherlands’, without reduction of pensions or 
social security, without rent increases and without cutbacks in health care 
(PVV 2012, 22–5). On these issues the PVV seemed to take almost Social 
Democratic positions, but perhaps ‘Social Conservative’ (in the sense that 
the PVV is radically opposed to welfare reforms) would be a better label.
Even if social policies gained importance for the PVV, its core business 
became more and more the struggle against mass immigration, Islam and 
European integration. Islamisation and European integration undermined 
the independence of the Netherlands, Wilders argued in his first publication 
after the break with the VVD (Wilders 2005, 103–4). Given his concern 
with national independence, it seems justified to call him a nationalist, 
though he preferred the term ‘patriot’, as he associated nationalism with 
destruction and hatred (Schwarz 2007). Here we use ‘nationalism’ in a 
more neutral sense, as an ideology that centres on the independence and 
identity of the nation, not necessarily on conquest or domination of other 
nations. Independence was undermined by two not unrelated trends, 
according to Wilders: Islamisation and the development of a European 
superstate. Mass immigration and multiculturalist policies had contributed 
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to the growing influence of Muslims in Dutch society and elsewhere in 
Europe. European integration encouraged multiculturalism and migration.
Wilders’s ideologue, the political scientest Martin Bosma (2010, 291-
303), suggested that the left-wing elites in Europe felt a lot of sympathy 
for Islamic values. Perhaps the elites were also concerned about Islamic 
terrorism and a shortage of oil in the future and hoped to stave off these 
threats by pacifying Islamic minorities in their countries (Niemöller 2007, 
34). Islam was not a religion but a political ideology in the eyes of the PVV, 
in many ways similar to fascism. It did not need the support of a majority 
of the population in order to win power, Bosma argued. History shows 
that fanatical minorities can capture power even against the will of the 
majority (Bosma 2010, 321). The Koran was a ‘fascist book’ that should 
be banned (Wilders 2007), Islamic schools should be closed, no more 
mosques should be built and immigration from Islamic countries should 
stop. Immigration from non-Islamic countries should not be encouraged 
either, especially migrant workers from Eastern Europe. Immigrants who 
committed a crime, who lost their job or who failed to adapt to Dutch 
culture should be expelled. Even immigrants who behaved well would 
not be entitled to social security for the first 10 years of their stay. Dutch 
language and history should get more attention in school. 
In 2012 the PVV even called for a return to the guilder and an exit from 
the EU (PVV 2012, 17). The party centered its election campaign in 
2012 on this issue, while the Islamisation issue receded somewhat into 
the background. The title of the election manifesto was rather revealing: 
‘Their Brussels, Our Netherlands!’ (Hún Brussel, óns Nederland). And in a 
curious redefinition of the term ‘nationalism’ the party explained that while 
‘other parties opt for Islam or EU-nationalism, we opt for the Netherlands’ 
(PVV 2012, 7). The PVV demanded that the bureaucrats in Brussels stop 
interfering with immigration, environmental protection, employment and 
financial policies in the Netherlands.
Nationalism was linked to populism. The progressive and cosmopolitan 
elites were fostering immigration and Islamisation, against the will of 
innocent people. ‘The Left is in power’, according to Bosma (2010, 319), 
and ‘Leftists control the civil service, the arts, the media, the unions, the 
judiciary, the universities, and they distribute the millions and the jobs in 
the subsidy network of the left . . . That elite has been in power for 40 years 
already, almost everywhere in society’.5 
5  All quotations have been translated by the authors.
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Whereas the leftist elite encouraged mass immigration, Bosma (2010, 
329) claims that ‘the Dutch people has always opposed vehemently mass 
immigration, Islam and the multicultural project’. The people also disagree 
with the climate theories of Al Gore, the European superstate, foreign aid, 
art subsidies and mild punishments for criminals (PVV 2010, 317). Only 
the people could stop these dangerous trends and save the country, in the 
eyes of the PVV. ‘Only the goodness and toughness of our citizens could 
cause a reversal of the trend. In history, it was always the ordinary people 
who took up arms when they were let down by the elites’ (Bosma 2010, 
325). Therefore, the people should receive more power, the power to veto 
legislation through a referendum and to elect a prime minister. Members of 
the Hoge Raad, the Supreme Court, should also be elected by the people 
(PVV 2012, 29–33). 
To sum up, the PVV has become increasingly nationalist and populist since 
its foundation, while liberal ideas have faded away or receded into the 
background and given way to a certain type of social conservatism with 
respect to the welfare state, as well as crime and justice issues. The shift 
may be explained at least to some extent in terms of electoral strategy. 
In an interview, Wilders stated: ‘We have a cultural-conservative profile, 
but we managed to break into the [electorate of the] left. They have not 
patented issues like health care, social security or labour market policies’ 
(Staal and Staps 2011). This strategy worked, at least in 2010.
Of the new voters that the party managed to win in that year, almost a 
third seemed to come from the left, from people who had previously voted 
for PvdA or SP (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 177). They tended to be 
less educated and less well-to-do than average. They may have been the 
losers of modernisation, but the data are not specific enough to warrant 
this conclusion. 
INTRA-PARTY DYNAMICS
Groep Wilders (Wilders Group) was the official name of the new one-man 
party in the Dutch lower house of parliament. In November 2004 Wilders 
had also established the foundation Stichting Groep Wilders to enable 
him to collect money and hire staff. Wilders took his time setting up the 
new party in a bid to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor Pim Fortuyn. 
Fortuyn had whipped up a party organisation almost overnight, but it soon 
fell apart as a result of internal conflicts. Efforts to build the movement 
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got slowly underway in March 2005, when Wilders launched a website, 
published a manifesto and began recruiting parliamentary candidates. The 
new PVV was launched in February 2006.
In organisational terms the PVV was not actually a party as it had only 
two formal members: the natural person Wilders and the legal person, 
Stichting Groep Wilders. Wilders, who was and still is under constant 
security protection, was also the only member of the foundation’s 
executive board. This was to prevent the names and addresses of other 
board members being traced through the Chamber of Commerce (Bosma 
2010, 26). The party thus consisted of Wilders and Wilders, a remarkable 
legal construction by which the party was obliged to dance to Wilders’s 
tune. Party platforms were drafted only by Wilders and candidates for 
elections were appointed by Wilders alone. 
The PVV did not recruit any members, initially for fear of infiltration by right-
wing extremists and troublemakers, but later also for ideological reasons. 
Wilders’s ideologue Bosma argued that a virtual or network party without 
members would only be accountable to the Dutch voter, not to an ‘odd, 
non-elected intermediate layer’ of party activists that called the shots 
within the party organisation (Bosma 2010, 30–1). According to Bosma, 
party activists would try to keep at bay any new ideas arising within society 
and would be concerned primarily with their own power: the structure of a 
member-based party has a disruptive effect on democracy. In his view the 
PVV was the first modern party of the Netherlands, much more democratic 
than the old member-based parties. ‘A memberless party means adding 
elements of direct democracy to indirect (representative) democracy’ 
(Bosma 2010, 215). 
While the decision to form a virtual party was dictated initially by practical 
considerations, if it were up to Bosma the model would be retained on 
principle. He predicted that the PVV was the model of the future. Rather 
than an association, the PVV should in fact become a foundation, which 
would require no members at all. The only problem was that the Electoral 
Act did not allow this if the PVV wished to contest elections under its own 
name. This antipathy towards political parties on the part of Wilders, and 
especially Bosma, seems to be characteristic of all populists, although few 
go so far as to reject any form of member-based organisation. 
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The PVV did in fact recruit informal members, if we also include staff, 
volunteers and parliamentary candidates. This was no easy matter, 
however, because of the anticipated risks to their personal security and 
possible consequences for their public careers. From the spring of 2005, 
Wilders had been receiving and questioning prospective parliamentary 
candidates at a highly secret address. Those who proved suitable then 
received political training. In August 2006 Wilders presented 19 candidates: 
4 women and 15 men. In political terms they were amateurs rather than 
politicians or party activists; only three had any political experience at the 
local or provincial level. 
From 2006 to 2010 Wilders succeeded in keeping the ranks closed; if there 
were any internal conflicts, almost none of it got out. Two MPs became 
embroiled in scandals, but Wilders did not expel them and managed to 
limit the political damage. Party discipline was very strict. However, after 
the early general elections of June 2010 the number of MPs increased 
from 9 to 24. Several candidates on the list turned out to be of dubious 
repute; some withdrew, others entered parliament and retained their 
seats. Wilders did not expel them from the party, perhaps also because he 
needed all his MPs to help the minority cabinet to a majority in the lower 
house of parliament. 
In the meantime the PVV had also contested the European elections of June 
2009 and the municipal elections of March 2010 in The Hague and Almere. 
In each case the candidate lists were headed by an MP. Via his confidants, 
Wilders was able to control nominations as well as candidates’ activities in 
the European Parliament and the two city councils. Initially the PVV leader 
himself continued to hold a city council seat in The Hague, but that soon 
proved to take up too much of his time. Alongside the problem of finding 
suitable candidates, the fear of losing control had probably influenced his 
decision to contest the local elections in just these two cities.
The PVV also needed to be represented in the upper house of parliament 
or Senate if it wanted to be able to support the minority cabinet there, 
too. Because the upper house is indirectly chosen by the members of the 
provincial legislatures (Provinciale Staten) the PVV fielded candidates in all 
12 provinces in the provincial elections of March 2011. The party won 69 
seats, which was enough for 10 seats in the Senate. It maintained discipline 
and unity in the Senate, but failed to do so in the provincial legislatures; 
within a year, nine members had seceded from the party. Similar problems 
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occurred at the local level, in the city councils of Almere and The Hague, 
and in the European Parliament, where one of the five members elected 
in 2009 was expelled after causing an accident while driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
Wilders had hoped to avoid problems of this kind, not just through 
a stringent selection process, but also through a tight hierarchical 
organisation in which newly elected members of legislatures were directed 
and controlled by more experienced MPs, in other words, close cronies 
of the party leader with a track record of loyalty. The formula did not work 
as expected, however. In practice, the dual roles took up too much time 
and energy, and a number of MPs soon withdrew from city councils and 
provincial legislatures. Thus the hierarchical model did not function as well 
as was hoped and there were complaints in the provinces about a lack of 
direction.
The parliamentary group was led by Wilders, its formal Chairman; his 
confidant Bosma, who was the Party Secretary and in charge of discipline; 
and Vice-President Fleur Agema, who was responsible for contacts, 
albeit very limited, with the media. Wilders wielded a great deal of power, 
especially as all MPs, those who entered parliament in 2006 and those 
who did so in 2010, knew that they owed their seat mainly to Wilders’s 
popularity. Yet even here, the unity proved fragile. In the spring of 2010 
Hero Brinkman, a former policeman whom Wilders had relegated to 
a lower ranking on the candidate list for the general elections in June, 
launched a public attack on Wilders’s leadership. Brinkman said that the 
PVV was built too much around one man and would face major difficulties 
if Wilders were to drop out. Brinkman also called for greater transparency 
within the party and for the enrolment of members as well as for the 
establishment of a youth organisation (Brinkman 2012). Brinkman met 
with little support and the parliamentary party rejected his proposals in 
autumn 2010. Following his defeat, Brinkman continued as a party MP 
until March 2012, when a website launched by the PVV prompted him 
to quit. The website encouraged citizens to report complaints about 
Central and Eastern European immigrants in the Netherlands. Brinkman 
said that there had been no consultation at all within the party about this 
initiative, which sparked a lot of controversy in both the Netherlands and 
the European Union (Jongejan 2012). He founded a new party, Democratic 
Political Turning Point (Democratisch Politiek Keerpunt, DPK) which 
obtained only 0.1% of the vote in September 2012 and no seats. In the 
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summer of 2012 three other MP’s left the PVV for different reasons. Two 
of them had been controversial and would probably not be nominated by 
Wilders again. They voiced strong criticisms about the erratic leadership, 
lack of transparency and opportunism within the PVV, which may have 
contributed to its electoral loss in September 2012.
 
Party finances
Like other parties in parliament, the PVV’s parliamentary group receives 
government funds to support the group’s activities, which must be spent 
only on staff and secretarial assistance. In 2011, the amount totalled nearly 
four million euros. Groups in other representative bodies also got financial 
support, in varying degrees. As a party, the PVV is ineligible for other public 
funding because of its decision not to enrol members. The lack of members 
also means that the party has no contribution revenues. As a result, it is 
completely dependent on donations from at home and abroad. Wilders 
has always refused to make any disclosures on this matter. Donations are 
channelled through a foundation, Friends of the PVV, so there is no legal 
duty of disclosure. According to some observers, the party receives large 
sums of money from conservative organisations and individuals in the US 
and perhaps Israel, but without hard evidence, reports of this kind remain 
speculative.6 
EFFECTS ON THE PARTY SYSTEM
In the 2006 general elections, most PVV voters came either directly or 
indirectly from the List Pim Fortuyn (more than 30% had voted for Fortuyn’s 
LPF in 2003), and to a lesser extent from the VVD, the CDA, the PvdA and 
the SP, whereas more than 20% had not voted in 2003 (van der Kolk, 
Aarts and Rosema 2007, 224–5). In 2010 the PVV also attracted many 
voters from the left who had voted for the PvdA or the SP in 2006. This 
group also won them five additional seats. They took about three seats 
from the Christian Democrats, but only one from the Liberals—on balance, 
since voters switched not only from the Liberals to the PVV, but often the 
other way round as well. In 2012 the PVV lost more than one-third of its 
electorate. Almost half of the defectors seem to have switched to the VVD, 
some returned to the PvdA or SP, while others stayed at home. 
6  Some sources have reported on the PVV’s finances, for example Botje (2009, 10); 
Geurtsen and Geels (2010); and Meeus and Valk (2010, 11–15).
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Since Fortuyn, all Dutch parties have adapted their policies on immigration 
and integration to some extent. The VVD practically ignored the issue 
in 2006, but took up fairly strong conservative positions in 2010 and 
2012, which may have been a reaction to the rise of the PVV. In 2010 it 
negotiated, with the CDA, an agreement with the PVV. The latter promised 
to support the government in four main areas: immigration, security, care 
for the elderly and financial policy. Immigration and security policies should 
become tougher, it was agreed, and care for the elderly should be improved 
rather than reduced. The three parties also agreed to disagree about Islam. 
CDA and VVD regarded it as a religion, whereas the PVV considered it a 
political ideology. 
This construction of a minority government officially supported by a 
third party was unique in Dutch history. It was controversial, especially 
among Christian Democrats. The membership of the VVD seemed almost 
unanimously in favour of the agreement, and delighted that a party member 
would become prime minister for the first time since the party was founded 
in 1948. 
The party congress of the CDA approved the agreement in October 2010, 
but only after intense and often emotional debate. About one-third of the 
4,000 members present voted against it, among them several former party 
leaders and former ministers. The two MPs who had opposed the agreement 
accepted the verdict of the party congress and gave up their opposition (Ten 
Hooven 2010, 106–8). The party leadership did not want to forego the chance 
to take part in government. Perhaps it cherished hope that the PVV would 
become more moderate in the process or would disintegrate, the way the 
LPF had done when involved in a coalition in 2002. Moreover, the VVD put 
some pressure on the Christian Democrats, after it had explored but rejected 
a coalition with PvdA, D66 and the Green Left. Yet when Wilders decided in 
April 2012 to end his support of the government, Christian Democrats and 
Liberals announced they would never cooperate with him again. Within the 
CDA, participation in the minority coalition supported by the PVV led to more 
soul-searching debates and might have contributed to its substantial electoral 
loss in 2012 (Ten Hooven 2012). With its radical anti-European position the 
PVV seemed fairly isolated in the Dutch party system by 2012, even if more 
moderate anti-European sentiments are expressed also by other parties like 
the SP and the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren). The VVD had again 
taken over some positions of the PVV in its election manifesto, for instance 
the demand that immigrants should not be allowed social security or welfare 
during the first 10 years of their stay in the Netherlands (VVD 2012, 49). 
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Wilders has succeeded in polarising political debates, however. His ordinary 
and rude language—calling a minister raving mad (knettergek) and telling 
the prime minister to behave himself (doe normaal man!)—have attracted 
media attention and may have contributed to a change in political culture 
(see also Kuitenbrouwer 2010; De Bruijn 2010). Dutch politicians used to be 
quite formal and polite to each other in parliamentary debates. During the 
past decade, Dutch politics has become more lively, at times even rough. 
The overall impact of the PVV is difficult to measure, however. It would seem 
exaggerated to conclude that Dutch politics as a whole has become more 
populist, if we use populism in the ideological sense and not as a rhetorical 
style. In fact, one could even argue that populism in the strict sense has lost 
importance, as direct democracy, referenda and direct election of mayors 
or prime ministers are no longer on the agenda. Nationalism, however, 
has probably become stronger both with respect to European integration 
and with respect to immigration and Islam. Extreme nationalist and neo-
Nazi groups do not seem to have benefited from this. Since 2000 they 
have become smaller and less effective than they were before (Lucardie, 
Voerman and Wielenga 2011, 258–60). As far as we know, there have been 
no contacts between them and the PVV.
OUTLOOK
After a series of impressive electoral victories, the PVV experienced a 
substantial loss in 2012. At the same time, the cohesion of its informal 
party organisation was weakened by internal dissidence and secessions in 
municipal councils, provincial legislatures and the Tweede Kamer. Wilders’s 
prestige as leader has suffered a serious blow, even if his leadership 
cannot be challenged given the authoritarian structure of the party. Sarah 
de Lange and David Art (2011, 1230, 1244) might have been too optimistic 
when they emphasised the cohesive and disciplined character of the 
parliamentary group and the institutionalisation of the party. Even so, it 
would be premature to forecast its demise in the foreseeable future. The 
example of the Austrian Freedom Party in the past decade suggests that a 
national populist party can survive participation in government, secessions 
and even the death of its leader. Moreover, the PVV might have learned 
from its unsuccessful support for a minority government and its poor 
management of internal tensions. It might offer an effective opposition to 
the coalition of VVD and PvdA that was formed in November 2012. The 
Liberal–Labour government intends to carry out fairly drastic budget cuts 
as well as reforms of the housing and labour market, which may alienate 
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substantial numbers of voters. Opinion polls in December 2012 suggest 
that the PVV was already recovering most of its losses, while support 
for the VVD (and to a lesser extent for the PvdA) was diminishing rapidly 
(Politieke Barometer 2012).
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